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Abstract. Recent adversarial attacks have been shown IoT devices weak-
nesses due to their limited computing power. Given also their ubiquitous
presence, lower costs and limitations in keeping security measures up-to-
date, resource-constrained devices represent a growing risk for the secu-
rity of IT infrastructure. The scope of the research is to investigate the
weaknesses of resource-constrained IoT devices. The methodology for the
investigation is the legal analysis of existing legal frameworks regulating
IoT cybersecurity and data security; afterwards it will be carried out a
critical evaluation of the existing best practices. This critical analysis
should face the twofold challenge of increasing transparency and trust in
resource-constrained systems. Users and companies are two faces of the
same coin: accountability of data collectors and user awareness are cru-
cial in the security and data protection debate. Thus, a comprehensive
overview of the relevant legal frameworks and guidelines would increase
the understanding of risks of the users, whilst data controllers (especially
of small and medium enterprises) may have an instrument to implement
properly security measures
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1 Theoretical Premise
This section will be devoted to look deeper into the rationales and aims of
privacy and data protection, on the one hand, and security, on the other hand,
into different perspectives, considered as a spectrum stretching from ethical and
legal understandings towards more technical approach.
The right to privacy is closely related to the right to data protection[1, 2],
they may often overlap, albeit with distinct scopes and rationales[3–5]: the for-
mer is conceived to protect people’s “opaqueness”, whilst the latter concerns
the “transparency” of the collection and process of personal data[6]. I would
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assume that an analysis on the right to privacy may not fail to consider also
data protection’s related aspects, given their intertwined relation.
The approaches all together lead to a holistic vision of what constitutes pri-
vacy, data protection and security. The goal here is not to provide an exhaustive
survey of the philosophies behind those concepts, but rather to structure the
most relevant themes in the literature by focusing on the underlying interests of
privacy, data protection and security in the field of resource-constrained devices.
Moreover, in the realm of IoT, a reflection on group privacy and collective
data protection seem appropriate[7]: emerging digital technologies, by process-
ing, linking and merging (big) data, are able to create new datasets, ready for
inferential analytics and profiling. “Rather than a unique data subject whose in-
formational self-determination is specifically under attack, individuals are more
often targeted as a member of a group, whereas they can even ignore being a part
of that group on the basis of a set of ontological and epistemological predicates
that cluster people into multiple categories”[8].
2 State of the Art
Nowadays, the Internet of Things (IoT) represents the next step towards digital-
ization, considering the wide range of IoT applications that have been developed
and deployed in the recent years.
Objects and people can be interconnected through communication networks,
in and across private, public and industrial spaces, and report about their status
and/or about the status of the surrounding environment[9].
The devices that are meant to be connected within the IoT network show
different capabilities and features having regard of computational power, mo-
bility, size, complexity, dispersion, power resource, placement, and connectivity
patterns[10]. Historically, the devices connected to the internet could have been
grouped into a homogeneous class, i.e. fully capable computers or peripherals
with endless source of power, characterized by large and quite expensive hard-
ware[10]. This classification is no longer true within the IoT network, which com-
bine together devices with limited CPU, memory and processing power (e.g.,
pressure sensors)[11] and devices with powerful processors, large memory and
replenishable sources for energy (e.g., smartphones). These applications require
low-cost hardware to be economically feasible, and they need to be small[12].
Also, recalling[13], one should consider that is unlikely to draw a comprehensive
overview of the huge class of embedded systems’ hardware components since they
are less standardized than hardware for personal computers[8]. Others layers of
complexity are brought by the intrinsic nature such devices and services which
operate on different local and global networks, are governed by diverse technical
and international legislative standards and developed by different manufactur-
ers[14].
IoT resource-constrained devices are likely to challenge many principles of
data protection and security. Identification technologies are a crucial component
of trusted communication in the IoT, but they may pose risks to users’ privacy
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in IoT context[15]. Data controllers can draw inferences from these data[16].
Discriminatory treatment can also result from inferential analytics and linkage
of disparate records[17], motivating limitations on user profiling. Moreover, in-
dividual control over personal data, as claimed by the work of the Article 29
Working Party (all of WP29 guidelines have been formally endorsed by EDPB
during its first preliminary meeting), is virtually impossible in the IoT context
due to the features of these systems[16].
Furthermore, in many IoT resource-constrained devices, deployed in order to
meet the various application requirements, privacy and security have emerged as
crucial challenges because on the one hand the systems have not been designed to
have effective security features[18], involving therefore cyber-security issues[19];
on the other hand the deployment of IoT resource-constrained devices poses a
threat to data (or information) security, namely the protection of information
(and information systems) from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and
availability[20].
Following a risk-based approach (the higher the risk, the more rigorous the
measures that the controller or the processor needs to take), the level of security
shall be assessed, according to art. 32 GDPR, having regard to the state of the
art, through the adoption of appropriate technical and organizational measures,
equally covering the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience
of processing systems and services.
In order to consider reliable and compliant such IT networks and systems
components, several security risk assessment methodologies and frameworks have
been developed[21], with the aim of helping data controllers in evaluating secu-
rity risks.
The project considers data controllers of SMEs and users as two sides of
the same coin, within the IoT ecosystem. A further development may also con-
sider the applicability of this framework to certification mechanisms issued by
competent Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), by turning therefore the initial
bipartite relation into a tripartite one.
The choice to focus solely on SMEs revolves around the understanding that
these actors, in order to be compliant and protected, face more efforts and dif-
ficulties than big companies[22][23]. The 2019 Senseon report points out that
nearly half of SMEs interviewed perceive investing in cyber security as a net
cost: “it is clear that they struggle to find value from their security stack or
products they use”[24]. Moreover, the Australian government carried out a sur-
vey with a dramatic scenario. SMEs are the target of 43% of all cybercrimes; 22%
of small businesses that were breached by the 2017 Ransomware attacks were so
affected they could not continue operating; 33% of businesses with fewer than 100
employees don’t take proactive measures against cyber security breaches; 87% of
small businesses believe their business is safe from cyberattacks because they use
antivirus software alone; Cybercrime costs the Australian economy more than 1
bllion annually[25][26].
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3 Research Questions
The research questions are grouped under three expected results that the re-
search should achieve. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that there is a twofold
difficulty in drawing a legal analysis in this field. Thus, relevant academic litera-
ture is still poor and emerging digital technologies lack as yet the legal certainty
and clarity on sector regulations.
Firstly, it is necessary to analyse the weaknesses of resource-constrained IoT
devices to understand the extent to which these new technologies represent a
risk, rather than a resource, for society. Therefore, this investigation will take
the form of a risk analysis of the IoT bounded-resources.
Thus, in this first part of the project the research questions could be framed
as follows: How could IoT resource-constrained de-vices be technically and legally
defined? What encompass the definition of “weakness” in the security context of
IoTs? To what extent the constrained nature of these devices represent a security
risk?
Furthermore, the second part of the project, namely the analysis of legal
framework regulating IoT security, addresses mainly a general question: what
is the applicable legal framework for ensuring security in IoT context? Indeed,
it is sufficient framing the concept of security into information security and
cyber security? Are there relevant extra-EU legal framework which refer to IoT
security1?
Thirdly, IoT technologies are likely to challenge many principles of data pro-
tection, producers and data controllers should be stimulated to go above and
beyond the strict legal requirements of existing regulations in order to elaborate
privacy enhancing systems and services that endeavor to reach, among all, the
principle of transparency (recital 58, GDPR ).
Therefore, the adoption of appropriate security framework and best practices
for resource con-strained devices raises further interrogatives: what are the rele-
vant soft law instruments in the context of resource-constrained devices security?
how can these instruments be implemented in order to be easily understood by
both users and entrepreneurs?
4 Methodology
4.1 Analysis of the Weaknesses of Resource-Constrained IoT
Devices
Setting the context Firstly, it has to be developed the notion of resource-
constrained IoT devices. Given the resource constraints, together with the self-
1 UK would enforce a mandatory labelling system to determine the level of security of
an internet-enabled device [27]; US federal legislation on data protection and privacy
seems not prepared to face the challenges posed by IoT [37, 40] -according to several
scholars, federal data protection and privacy laws are to some extent not adequate
to face the challenges posed by IoT, even though some States, like California, have
taken countermeasures through a bottom-up approach [28].
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organization and short-range communication, these technologies always resort
to the cloud for outsourced storage and computation[29]. This process, involving
cyber-sensors with limited energy and storage, brings several security and pri-
vacy threats. Indeed, adversaries can actively intercept or manipulate data, or
passively monitor data transmission[30]. The exhibition of significant differences
in available execution environments, processing, and storage capabilities would
add an extra layer of difficulty. In conclusion, to compose a diverse collection
of individual elements, a structured approach is needed to uniformly and trans-
parently deploy application components onto a large number of heterogeneous
devices[31].
Risk analysis An evaluation of security risks within the IoT ecosystem2 will be
carried on taking primary guidance and structure from the ENISA methodology.
This part shall look deeper into the different steps of a privacy risk assessment
process, by carrying out a critical analysis of the methods provided for by existing
relevant guidelines and standards.
4.2 Analysis of Legal Frameworks Regulating IoT Security
Notion of information security The concept of information security under-
pins the understanding of security oriented towards the protection of data and
information[32]: the so-called CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity) typical of the computer security is expanded to include other principles such
as non-repudiation, authenticity, accountability and auditability. The legal anal-
ysis of this section will mainly address, as regulative instruments, the GDPR
and the Regulation on non-personal data.
GDPR The EU Regulation 2016/679 states, at article 32, that controller and the
processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, taking into account the state of
the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes
of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights
and freedoms of natural persons.Standards urgently require further specification
and implementation into the design and deployment of IoT technologies for users
to make an informed decision if they want to use their services[33].
Regulation on non-personal data The EU Regulation 2018/1807 constitutes a
framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union. The
expanding Internet of Things represent one of the major sources of non-personal
data. Specific examples of non-personal data include aggregate and anonymised
datasets used for big data analytics; nonetheless, whether technological improve-
ments may convert anonymised data into personal data, such process of data has
to be treated under the rules of the GDPR.
2 [22], 17-33: definition of the processing operation and its context; understanding and
evaluating impact; definition of possible threats and evaluation of their likelihood;
evaluation of risk.
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Notion of cyber-security Cyber-security generally refers to the ability to
protect or defend the use of cyber-space form cyber-attacks[34]. It, therefore,
encompasses a broad range of risks governance. The level of safety of individ-
uals and businesses in cyber-space is relevant as a value in itself and in view
of national security perceived as a critical sphere where everyone is involved.
Thus, this understanding may gather three lines of action such as the critical
infrastructure protection, the digital market development and the safeguarding
of the fundamental rights and freedoms.
The legal analysis of this section will mainly focus on relevant legal measures
that aim to boost the overall level of cybersecurity in the EU, such as: the Cy-
bersecurity Act, namely the EU Regulation 2019/881 on ENISA (the European
Union Agency for Cy-bersecurity) and on information and communications tech-
nology cybersecurity certification,the ”eIDAS” Regulation or Regulation (EU)
910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transac-
tions in the internal market and the ”NIS” Directive on security of network and
information systems.
The intertwined relation between cybersecurity and information se-
curity
Interrelation with privacy by design and privacy by default Privacy by design
and privacy by default are closely interlinked with security of processing (article
32 GDPR), another essential GDPR requirement, since they together fall within
the broad notion of “privacy engineering, i.e. embedding privacy requirements
into the information systems’ design and operation”[35].
Critical analysis of the current PETs adopted Data minimization3 and other
various GDPR principles such as privacy by design and by default can in several
instances be achieved by the use of security and privacy enhancing technolo-
gies[36][35]. Therefore, pseudonimisation4, encryption as well as the procedure
for managing encryption keys (creation, storage, change in the event of sus-
pected cases of compromised data), anonymization techniques and other PETs
(such as VPN, onion routing, DNS security extension, transport layer security
and private information retrieval) should be used in order to achieve information
privacy goals. However, relevant literature showed that PETs may be flawed as
a well-motivated hacker would be able to re-identify the individual [33].
3 Data minimisation is one of the core principle of the European data protection
framework, stating that personal data should only be processed if the purpose of the
processing cannot be fulfilled by other means.
4 [37],pseudonymization , 1744: pseudonymization is a common tool to impede the
identification of an individual through her personal data: such data can no longer
be attributed to her without using additional information, which must be kept sep-
arately. The risk of re-identification is higher with pseudonymized data than with
anonymized ones: as Ohm noted, “just as “anonymize” fails to acknowledge reversible
scrubbing, “pseudonymize” fails to credit robust scrubbing”.
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- Pseudonimisation, anonymization and encryption Moreover, as noted in [19,
38] data are generally encrypted or anonymized only later on, in the cloud server:
aggregated data are of real value at the very first stage, before being compressed
and sent to the cloud for being processed. Thus, these techniques usually take
place when the valuable information have already been extracted from the data.
When the data generated by Internet of Things devices are collected anony-
mously or directly anonymized, either on the device or in the cloud, GDPR
will not be applicable to profiling based on these data. However, the Article 29
Working Party identified the risk of re-identification of personal data as one of
the main six data protection challenges for the Internet of Things [39, 37, 40].
- DPIA requirement Moreover, the General Data Protection Regulation states
that where a type of processing is likely to result in a high risk for the rights
and freedoms of individuals, which would likely be the case of IoT, the con-
troller shall carry out a DPIA, i.e. [41]: according to Article 29 Working Party,
several IoT applications are likely to pose significant concerns with regard to
individuals’ right to privacy and data protection; therefore, they require a DPIA
[42]. Nevertheless, as noted in [15], “the uncertain value of personal data gen-
erated and processed by IoT devices and services necessarily limits the scope
of risks that can be foreseen, and thus reduces the protection actually offered
by DPIAs”. Also, the DPIA should not be confused with the security risk as-
sessment (as per the first phase). Indeed, while, the latter is a crucial step of
the former, a DPIA considers several other requirements related to the personal
data processing, going beyond security.
4.3 Security Framework and Best Practices for Resource
Constrained Devices
Following the evaluation of the level of the risk, attained in section 3.1, the
research project focuses on the analysis of appropriate security measures for
resource-constrained devices.
Knowledge for this part of research will be collected, as a main resource, from
ENISA’s works[22]. According to article 32 of GDPR, two categories of measures
will be taken into account: organizational and technical ones. Afterwards, these
bipartion will be further framed into subsections, explaining how each measure
relates to specific provisions of GDPR. Each subsection measures, both techni-
cal5 and organizational6, will be consider in a scaled classification per risk level.
In order to achieve scalability, it is assumed that all measures described under
the low level are applicable to all levels. Similarly, measures presented under the
medium level are applicable also to high level of risk. Measures presented under
the high level are not applicable to any other level of risk [22].
5 [22], 33-39: security management; incident response and business continuity; human
resources.
6 [22], 39-48: access control and authentication; logging and monitoring; security of
data at rest; network/communication security; back-ups; mobile/portable devices;
application lifecycle security; data deletion/disposal; physical security.
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5 Project Proposal
The PhD thesis will investigate, under the lens of regulations and standards in
force nowadays, how the security of personal data processing and cybersecurity
can be lawfully enforced by data controllers (especially of SMEs) in resource-
constrained IoT systems with a security risk management plan compliant and,
on the other side how user’s trust can be enhanced. The aim of the project is
therefore to provide a legal analysis of the broad notion of security of processing
and cybersecurity, and its intertwined relation with both data controllers and
users, within the IoT ecosystem, in order to bridge the gap between the legal
provisions and their understanding as well as the perception of risk. The for-
mer (data controllers) may benefit from this work made up by legislative texts,
standards, guidelines and code of conducts in developing a security risk man-
agement plan, the latter (users) will better understand the risks connected to
the security of their devices and of the processing involving their data. Data
protection as transparency is perceived as a crucial issue, even more with grow-
ing spread of ubiquitous IoT applications, since most privacy enhancing tools
(PETs) are useless if they are not used properly or if they are not implemented
in an automated way: thus, “new approaches to transparency of data collections
and accountability of data collectors and user awareness are crucial the privacy
debate” [43–45]. Furthermore, as expressed in [46], transparency may contribute
to the accountability of data controllers.Limitations on user oversight and on
transparency in management of security of processing are likely to ease data
breaches and undermine trust, by hampering therefore the significant potential
of IoT devices.
Furthermore, I will get in touch with local companies to identify suitable
case-studies where to apply and evaluate the effectiveness of the project.
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